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Abstract 
In the past few years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against 
international institutions. This paper presents a framework for analyzing the challenges that 
unilateral, voter-based attempts by one member state to change or terminate the terms of 
existing international agreements pose for international cooperation. It argues that the mass 
politics of international disintegration are shaped by an “accommodation dilemma” 
encountered by the other member states: not accommodating such unilateral attempts is costly, 
yet accommodating the revisionist country’s disintegration bid carries large contagion risks. 
Using original survey data from approximately 1.800 British and 60.000 EU-27 Europeans as 
well as comparative case studies, the paper shows that this framework can help us better 
understand the ability of foreign governments’ to intervene in domestic disintegration 
referendum campaigns, the existence of contagion effects across member states and variation 
in the responses of the remaining member states to voter-based disintegration bids. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the world has witnessed an unprecedented popular backlash against 
international institutions. Faced with increasing trade-offs between the gains from international 
cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty (Rodrik 2011), popular demands to not only 
slow down, but to reverse international integration have proliferated. The most prominent 
example of such an instance of “voter-based disintegration” is the 2016 Brexit referendum in 
the United Kingdom (UK), in which British voters decided to leave the European Union (EU). 
This direct democratic vote has set in motion the biggest withdrawal negotiations ever seen in 
an international organization. Although highly disruptive and unusual, Brexit is, however, not 
unique. Voters in Greece, Iceland, and Switzerland have used popular referendums to repudiate 
the terms of existing international agreements in recent years. And US President Trump has 
fulfilled key campaign promises by withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord and 
renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Skepticism about the 
merits of international cooperation is nothing new (see for examples the overviews in Hobolt 
and de Vries 2016; Kuo and Naoi 2015). But the vehemence with which it has manifested itself 
more recently is a new development.  
Much research has focused on the causes of this popular turn against international 
cooperation (there is a growing literature on this issue, see e.g., Clarke et al. 2017; Colantone 
and Stanig 2018; Copelovitch and Pevehouse 2019; Curtis et al. 2014; Goodwin and Heath 
2016; Hobolt 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Sciarini et al. 2015; De Vries 2018). Much 
attention has also been paid to the internal political struggles that follow upon popular votes to 
fully or partially withdraw from an international agreement. However, there is much less 
research about what a unilateral withdrawal from an international institution means for the 
institution’s other member states. This is surprising because the consequences of voter-based 
efforts of disintegration reach far beyond the countries in which they originate. Not only does 
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one member’s unilateral bid to improve its membership terms threaten to leave the others worse 
off. Voter-based disintegration bids by one member state also reverberate among the elites and 
the mass publics in other countries. These reverberations will be particularly pronounced when 
the withdrawal occurs in a highly visible and politicized manner such as through a referendum 
vote, which politicizes the withdrawal process and provides it with a high degree of legitimacy 
and a lot of attention both at home and abroad. For example, after the Brexit referendum vote, 
euphoric Eurosceptics across Europe, from France’s Marine le Pen to the Slovak People's Party-
Our Slovakia, called for similar referendums in their own countries. And across the Atlantic, 
then-candidate Donald Trump tweeted that British voters “took their country back, just like we 
will take America back.”1 Similarly, the leaders of Spain’s Podemos or Italy’s Five-Star-
Movement celebrated Greece’s 2015 referendum-based bid for a more generous bailout 
package, raising fears that it would spark similar demands in other Eurozone crisis countries.  
Voter-based disintegration thus poses considerable risks of political contagion by 
weakening the benefits of international cooperation and emboldening integration-sceptics 
elsewhere. Not surprisingly, this phenomenon is widely seen as a serious threat to international 
cooperation. The Economist has warned that the “politics of anger” might lead to an unravelling 
of globalization and the prosperity it has created (The Economist 2016). This concern is shared 
by academics, who have argued that growing popular support for disintegration poses a 
fundamental challenge for international institutions such as the EU (e.g., Blyth 2016; Hobolt 
2016) and the contemporary liberal world order more generally (e.g., Ikenberry 2018; Pepinsky 
2017; Rodrik 2017). However, political contagion does not always occur. For example, public 
support for the EU has increased since the Brexit referendum (Eurobarometer 2017), popular 
appetite to leave the Iran Deal has not spread to other countries, and no other country has 
followed the US’ lead in withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord (although Brazil’s 
                                               
1 Tweet from June 24, 2016 
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president Bolsonaro has been toying with the idea). Against this backdrop, it is imperative to 
better understand how voter-based attempts to revert integration spread, how they can be 
contained, and which dynamics they produce in the international arena. In short, we need a 
better understanding of the mass politics of international disintegration and their implication 
for international relations.  
So far, however, our theoretical tools to develop such an understanding are 
underdeveloped. There is vast research on the creation and functioning of international 
institutions (for overviews, see e.g. Gilligan and Johns 2012; Martin and Simmons 2013; 
Pevehouse and von Borzyskowski 2016), but analysis of how such institutions disintegrate has 
remained rudimentary (for notable exceptions, see von Borzyskowski and Vabulas 2019; 
Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 2018; Gray 2018; Helfer 2005, 2017; Leeds and Savun 2007).2 For 
example, in the Oxford Handbook of International Organizations (Cogan et al. 2016), none of 
the 55 chapters focuses on the dissolution of international organizations. Even in research on 
the European Union, where scholars have had to grapple with the challenges of popular 
Euroscepticism for some time (Hooghe and Marks 2009), a theory of European disintegration 
remains elusive (Börzel 2018). Scholars agree that disintegration is not “integration in reverse”, 
but not on much else (Jones 2018; Rosamond 2016; Vollaard 2014; Webber 2013). A better 
understanding of the causes, dynamics, and consequences of international disintegration is thus 
urgently needed (Schneider 2017). 
This paper works towards this goal by conceptualizing and systematically exploring the 
mass politics of international disintegration. It first defines voter-based disintegration as a 
unilateral attempt by one member state to change or terminate the terms of an existing 
international agreement on the basis of a strong popular mandate. Voter-based disintegration is 
                                               
2 I define international institutions as relatively stable sets of norms and rules that pertain to the international 
system, the actors in the system and their activities (Duffield 2007). They cover a spectrum that ranges from 
international treaties to supranational organizations.  
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thus a specific type of international disintegration. It then examines the challenges that a voter-
based disintegration bid by member state presents to the remaining member states: I argue that 
the mass politics of international disintegration are fundamentally shaped by an 
“accommodation dilemma,” that is the dilemma that accommodating the revisionist country’s 
disintegration bid carries large contagion risks, but that non-accommodation is costly to the 
remaining member states. The remainder of the paper examines how this dilemma shapes how 
the remaining member states respond to voter-based disintegration, both before and after the 
vote. I illustrate the merits of this argument by exploring several empirical implications of this 
argument. Analyses using original survey data from approximately 1.800 British and 60.000 
EU-27 Europeans as well as comparative case studies of four voter-based disintegration events 
show that my framework can help us better understand the ability of foreign governments’ to 
intervene in domestic disintegration referendum campaigns, the existence of contagion effects 
across member states and variation in the responses of the remaining member states to voter-
based disintegration bids. The conclusion discusses the long-term challenges that the mass 
politics of disintegration pose for international cooperation.  
 
2. What is Voter-based Disintegration? 
I define voter-based disintegration as a process in which a member state of an 
international institution attempts to unilaterally change or terminate the terms of an existing 
international agreement on the basis of a strong popular mandate. It aims at international 
disintegration because it seeks to partly or fully withdraw from the rules of an international 
institution, such as an international agreement or an international or supranational organization. 
It is voter-based because it is grounded in strong domestic popular support, expressed for 
example in a referendum vote or as part of a successful candidate’s election campaign. This not 
only provides the disintegration decision with a high degree of democratic legitimacy, but also 
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politicizes the question of whether an international treaty can be changed ex post or terminated 
among the other member states (Hutter et al. 2016; Zürn 2014). Voter-based instances of 
disintegration therefore tend to be much more politicized and salient in the political debate than 
disintegration decisions taken by a small foreign policy elite.3 Voter-based disintegration 
should be seen as a process. Its starting point is domestic integration skepticism, but it acquires 
an international dimension as soon as the national government takes up this mounting domestic 
pressure to negotiate better membership terms with the other member states. If the other states 
do not accommodate such a request, the process can accelerate: the disintegrating state 
officially announces its intention to partially or fully withdraw from the international institution, 
negotiates the terms of withdrawal, and ultimately withdraws from specific rules or the entire 
international institution. Of course, the process can also end along this way, if the disintegrating 
state backs down. The most prominent example of such an instance of “voter-based 
disintegration” is the 2016 Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom (UK), in which British 
voters decided to leave the European Union (EU). This direct democratic vote has set in motion 
the biggest withdrawal negotiations ever seen in an international organization. Although highly 
disruptive and unusual, Brexit is, however, not unique. Voters in Greece, Iceland, and 
Switzerland have used popular referendums to repudiate the terms of existing international 
agreements in recent years. And across the Atlantic, US President Trump has fulfilled key 
campaign promises by withdrawing from the Paris Climate Accord or the Iran deal, and 
renegotiating the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  
Skepticism about the merits of international cooperation is nothing new (see for 
examples the overviews in Hobolt and de Vries 2016; Kuo and Naoi 2015). But the vehemence 
with which it has manifested itself more recently is a new development. Figure 1 shows that 
voter-based disintegration efforts have proliferated in the recent decade. It focuses on 
                                               
3 For a discussion of these latter instances, see von Borzyskowski and Vabulas (2019) or Leeds and Savun (2007). 
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referendums, the clearest form of voter-based disintegration efforts and distinguishes between 
“integration referendums” that establish or deepen cooperation between states and 
“disintegration referendums” that, if successful, roll back existing forms of international 
cooperation, either partially by unilaterally mandating changes to an agreement, or fully, by 
mandating a withdrawal.  
 
Figure 1: Number of integration and disintegration referendums, 1970-2018 
 
Source: C2D Datenbank, Zentrum für Demokratie Aarau, updated by myself for recent years. Author’s 
classification of all national referendums on questions concerning international cooperation. 
 
Figure 1 shows that while referendums aimed at international disintegration are still 
relatively rare, they have become much more frequent and much more dominant in recent years. 
Nine of the ten disintegration referendums held so far and almost all ‘successful’ ones (i.e. 
resulting in a disintegrative vote) have been held since 2010.4 Moreover, populist leaders across 
                                               
4 The disintegration referendums are the 1975 UK referendum on continued EC membership, the 1984 Greenland 
referendum on leaving the EC, the 1986 Spanish referendum on continued NATO membership, the 2000 Brazil 
IMF referendum, the 2010 and 2011 Icesave referendums, the 2014 Swiss “Against Mass Immigration” initiative, 
the 2014 Swiss ECOPOP initiative, the 2015 Greek bailout referendum, the 2016 Swiss Implementation Initiative, 
the 2016 Hungarian refugee quota referendum, the 2016 British Brexit referendum, and the 2018 Swiss self-
determination initiative.  







New or deeper cooperation Other Change or withdrawal from existing agreement
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Europe have called for more disintegration referendums, so that the number may continue to 
grow. It is not a coincidence that these referendums are mostly directed against the EU, which 
has achieved a level of integration that makes the trade-offs between national sovereignty, 
democracy and international cooperation gains particularly pronounced (Rodrik 2011). Yet we 
also see strong voter-based disintegration attempts in other countries and directed against other 
international institutions as well, for example in the US or in Brazil, where presidential 
candidates have made changing or leaving international treaties key promises in their election 
campaigns.  
 
3. Voter-based disintegration as a challenge for the other member states 
Voter-based disintegration efforts by one member state have significant spillover effects 
for the other parties to the respective international agreement or international institution. First, 
such unilateral decisions undermine the overall economic and political attractiveness of the 
international institution. International cooperation is typically established because both sides 
benefit from such cooperation, even if the gains of cooperation are not always shared equally 
(Abbott and Snidal 1998; Gruber 2000; Keohane 1984). This suggests that the withdrawal of 
one member state or a renegotiation in one state’s favor reduces the share of the cooperation 
gains the other member states enjoy: Reintroducing barriers to cooperation that the international 
institution had hitherto removed, is costly both in economic and more general efficiency terms. 
For example, if disintegration leads to the re-introduction of trade barriers, exporters in both 
the remaining members and the leaving state will be hurt and international supply chains will 
be disrupted. This is likely to cause job losses and economic downturns in both the leaving state 
and the remaining members. Other forms of cooperation and policy coordination between the 
remaining countries and the leaving country – from police cooperation to environmental 
protection – are also likely to become more difficult. This creates transaction costs, economic 
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distortions, and also financial risks that arise as economic agents adjust to the new disintegrated 
environment. As a result, the attractiveness of the international institution for the remaining 
member states declines, which creates the risks that other member states will find it no longer 
worth to pay the price of membership. Moreover, especially when the withdrawing member 
state is an important and powerful member, upholding the institution may be difficult, even 
when the remaining member states in principle want to do it – the Iran Nuclear Deal is a case 
in point.  
Second, disintegration bids carry political contagion risks because they can embolden 
integration-sceptics elsewhere. By demonstrating that countries can unilaterally improve their 
position through voter-based disintegration bids, unilateral renegotiations of or withdrawals 
from international agreements are likely to spur similar demands in other member states as well. 
This effect is likely to be particularly strong when the disintegration move is strongly rooted in 
domestic mass politics, because such instances tend to be highly salient and politicized and 
therefore tend to reverberate far beyond their own country. As a result, such instances are 
particularly likely to affect public opinion and disintegration support in other member states 
(Hobolt 2016; De Vries 2017; Walter 2019b). For voters, it is generally difficult to correctly 
predict how one’s country would fare if it left an existing international institution. But observing 
another country’s disintegration trajectory provides voters with information about the likely 
response of the other member states and the likely economic, social, and political consequences 
of disintegration (Kayser and Peress 2012; De Vries 2018). A disintegration experience that 
improves the situation of the withdrawing country demonstrates that integration can be reversed 
and that nation states can be better off on their own. A successful renegotiation or withdrawal 
by one member state is therefore likely to encourage disintegrative tendencies in other member 
states.5 This diffusion of disintegrative tendencies among the institution’s remaining member 
                                               
5 This effect has also been well documented in the context of secession on the national level  (Walter 2006b; 2006a; 
Coggins 2011). 
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states poses a threat to the long-run viability of the international institution as a whole. At the 
same time, however, observing that a country is worse-off post-disintegration (or aborts its 
disintegration bid for fear of negative consequences) is likely to make them more pessimistic 
about their own country’s post-disintegration future. Such a “deterrence effect” should thus 
decreases voters’ enthusiasm for an exit of their own country.6 
These spillover effects create considerable challenges for policymakers in the other 
member states. At the same time, however, even though a country can unilaterally repudiate its 
membership in an international institution, the remaining member states have a significant say 
about the terms of any future relationship that is to replace the existing cooperative 
arrangement. How the disintegration process evolves, and whether the country pursues or aborts 
its disintegration request, therefore depends to a large degree on the other member states of the 
international institution. These other states can choose from a wide array of possible reactions: 
One the one extreme, the remaining states can accommodate the democratically expressed wish 
of the other people, e.g. by granting the exceptions demanded or by maintaining wide-ranging 
post-withdrawal cooperation with the withdrawing state. Such an accommodation strategy 
changes the terms of such an agreement to the disintegrating country’s benefit ex post, but also 
preserves the benefits from cooperation to the extent possible. However, accommodation comes 
with two downsides for the other member states: not only does it tend to leave the remaining 
member states worse off than under the status quo, but it also carries considerable political 
contagion risks by setting an attractive precedent for disintegration. On the other extreme, the 
remaining member states can take a hard, non-accommodating stance by refusing to make 
concessions or to grant exceptions and by making withdrawal or non-compliance costly for the 
disintegrating country. This, in turn, lowers contagion risks and raises the probability that the 
                                               
6 These effects are not limited to voters in other countries but may extend to voters in the leaving state, who may 
update and potentially change their preferences as the true benefits or costs of disintegration are revealed. Beyond 
the effect on disintegration support, the encouragement and deterrence effect are also likely to influence how voters 
evaluate the international institution and the merits of international cooperation more generally (Clements et al. 
2014; Ecker-Ehrhardt 2012). 
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withdrawing state will retract its withdrawal bid (as the Swiss and the Greek ultimately did at 
the end of their negotiations with the EU member states about how to implement 
noncooperative referendum votes). If the withdrawing state does not back down, however, this 
strategy tends to be very costly for the remaining member states as they lose out on the benefits 
of cooperation that they had so far mutually enjoyed. 
Given that both main strategies available to member states have significant downsides, 
the question of how to respond to a unilateral disintegration bid thus presents policymakers with 
an “accommodation dilemma” (Jurado et al. 2018; Walter 2019a). On the one hand, non-
accommodation will be costly not just for the disintegrating state, but also for the remaining 
member states. But, at the same time, making the disintegrating country better off outside the 
international institution by allowing it to enjoy the benefits of cooperation without sharing the 
costs threatens the long-term stability of the international institution. This dilemma creates a 
strategically difficult situation in which public opinion features both as a constraint on and an 
outcome of the disintegration negotiations.  
Brexit illustrates the accommodation dilemma nicely. While granting the UK continued 
access to the EU’s single market would maintain existing economic ties and preserve many 
cooperation gains in the other member states, the remaining EU-27 member states are weary 
that such a response might put the entire European project at risk in the long run by creating 
incentives for other countries to defect as well. In contrast, the non-accommodation strategy 
might dampen others’ incentives to leave the EU, but would come at a high economic price for 
both the UK and the remaining member states (Hix 2018).  
Given these negative externalities, policymakers in the other member states need to 
confront the question of how to respond to one member state’s unilateral, voter-based 
disintegration bid. The resulting politics of voter-based disintegration will be fundamentally 
shaped by the accommodation dilemma, both before a disintegration vote and after such a vote.  
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Challenges for foreign policymakers before the vote 
When faced with a disintegration referendum in another member state or an election in 
which integration-sceptic candidates have a good chance of winning (such as Donald Trump in 
the 2016 US elections or Marine Le Pen in the 2017 French presidential elections), 
policymakers abroad tend to have clear preferences for the voting outcome: Because a unilateral 
bid for renegotiation of or withdrawal from an international institution puts the remaining 
member states in a difficult and costly situation, the best case scenario for these policymakers 
is an election or referendum outcome in which the candidate or proposal favoring disintegration 
loses and those in favor of continued integration win. This creates incentives for policymakers 
abroad to get involved in what would normally be regarded another country’s domestic affairs: 
a foreign election or referendum campaign (Walter et al. 2018).  
Such foreign interventions in domestic elections or referendum campaigns raise both 
normative and practical questions. In normative terms, foreign interventions in domestic 
referendum and election campaigns, especially in its more active forms, violate the principle of 
non-interference in domestic affairs and thus conflict with national sovereignty. Yet, as 
democratically elected leaders, foreign policymakers are also tasked to represent the interests 
of their citizens. From this viewpoint, interventions in a foreign campaign with the intention to 
protect the country’s own voters from harm may be legitimate. These normative questions about 
the legitimacy of foreign campaign interventions are difficult to resolve. 
Equally difficult are the practical difficulties of intervening in another country’s election 
or referendum campaign. In principle, voters abroad should be interested in learning about the 
likely response of the other member states to a noncooperative voting outcome in advance – 
after all, how such a vote would ultimately play out for the disintegrating country significantly 
depends on whether the other member states will accommodate such a disintegration bid or not. 
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Voters tend to understand this strategic complication (Christin et al. 2002; Finke and Beach 
2017; Hobolt 2009), but also often misperceive the strategic incentives of the other member 
states to take a non-accommodating stance and therefore view their country’s post-integration 
future too optimistically (Grynberg et al. 2019; Milic 2015; Sciarini et al. 2015). Such optimism 
makes voters more willing to risk breaking apart from an international organization.7 This gives 
foreign policymakers an incentive to communicate their likely reaction to a disintegrative vote, 
their preferred voting outcome, and their resolve to the voters abroad. Least intrusive, foreign 
policymakers can try to coax voters in the other country to vote in favor of continued 
cooperation, for example by emphasizing the value of continued membership, making 
normative appeals and promising future benefits. However, they can also take a more 
aggressive stance, warning, or even threatening, voters about the negative consequences of a 
disintegrative vote. Finally, they can actively intervene in the campaign, such as European 
policymakers did in the run-up to the 2015 Greek bailout referendum when they cut off Greece 
from additional financing during the referendum campaign.8  
Such intervention is no easy feat, however, because foreign policymakers face obstacles 
with regard to the credibility, the effectiveness, and the costs of such interventions (Walter et 
al. 2018). Because foreign policymakers act in the interest of their own country, their 
interventions in domestic election campaigns may not be credible or effective. Positive foreign 
messages can easily go unheard in a heated domestic campaign. With regards to warnings, 
foreign governments face private information and time-inconsistency problems that make it 
particularly difficult for them to credibly communicate their resolve not to accommodate a non-
cooperative vote (Fearon 1995). Because non-accommodation also imposes costs on those other 
countries themselves, their pledge to punish such a vote ex post may suffer from credibility 
                                               
7 Similar over-optimism has been documented with regard to subnational secession, such as in independence 
referendums in Québec (Blais et al. 1995), Catalonia (Muñoz and Tormos 2015), and Scotland (Curtice 2014). 
8 Increasingly, foreign involvement in domestic campaigns also occurs in more decentralized forms via social 
media (e.g., Corstange and Marinov 2012; Sevin and Uzunoğlu 2017). I am not considering outright illegal forms 
of foreign interventions here. 
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issues and may therefore not be taken seriously by domestic voters. What is worse, they can 
also backfire if voters perceive them as an undue interference in domestic affairs (Shulman and 
Bloom 2012). As such, foreign interventions may not be very effective. To illustrate this 
problem, consider the 2016 Brexit campaign in the UK: Because of the large risks that Brexit 
posed for the European integration project, EU and EU-27 policymakers had a strong interest 
in a ‘remain’-outcome in the referendum. Yet, they were rather hesitant to get too strongly 
involved in the Brexit campaign because it was feared that, given the widespread British distrust 
towards to EU, such interventions might strengthen, rather than weaken, the Leave-camp 
(Glencross 2016). In fact, the British prime minister David Cameron, a remainer, had asked the 
EU Commission not to get involved in the Brexit referendum campaign.  
Faced with these difficulties of signaling their resolve, another way for foreign 
policymakers to increase the credibility of their interventions is to send costly signals about 
their determination not to accommodate a voting outcome that would harm their own citizens. 
To be effective, however, these signals have to carry considerable costs, without any guarantee 
that this investment will pay off. For example, the interventions by Eurozone policymakers in 
the referendum campaign leading up to the 2015 Greek bailout referendum were very costly, 
yet ultimately unsuccessful. The Greek government had called the referendum to force the 
country’s creditors to give it better terms on a bailout agreement for the crisis-ridden country. 
This would have fundamentally changed the existing mode of EMU crisis management, which 
is why the other Eurozone member states were adamantly opposed to a Greek exception. To 
underline their resolve, European policymakers resorted to a clear demonstration of their 
determination not to accommodate a referendum vote against the bailout agreement on offer. 
When the existing bailout agreement expired during the referendum campaign, they refused to 
extend it for a few days and the ECB declined Greece’s request to increase emergency liquidity 
assistance to Greek banks. These decisions forced the Greek government to close the banks and 
to become the first developed country to ever default on an IMF loan early on in the referendum 
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campaign. The costs of this European signal of resolve were immense, not just for Greece, but 
also for the other Eurozone governments. This intervention on net did sway about 10% of Greek 
voters away from voting no and towards voting yes (Walter et al. 2018).9 Nonetheless, right 
before the vote, a majority of Greeks believed that a non-cooperative referendum outcome 
would result in continued negotiations, whereas only about one quarter thought that a No-vote 
would lead to Grexit. Thus, the foreign intervention in the Greek referendum campaign overall 
failed to convince most Greek voters that the other Eurozone countries were resolved not to 
accommodate a negative vote. Ultimately, the foreign intervention did not succeed in changing 
the referendum outcome in favor of a cooperative outcome – despite the huge costs.  
Overall, intervening in other countries’ election or referendum campaigns is thus a 
tricky path for policymakers, not just because of normative legitimacy concerns, but also for 
practical reasons. Credibility problems and the high costs of credible signals about the other 
member states’ resolve thus are likely to reduce the effectiveness of foreign interventions in 
election or referendum campaigns that champion a pro-disintegration candidate or proposal. 
 
Challenges for foreign policymakers after the vote 
Once the voters in one member state have cast a popular vote in favor of disintegration, 
the other member states are squarely confronted with the accommodation dilemma. How the 
disintegration process evolves, and whether and to what extent the country succeeds or aborts 
its disintegration request, depends to a large degree on the other member states of the 
international institution. Yet policymakers in these countries confront the trade-off between 
minimizing the loss of cooperation gains that disintegration entails and minimizing the risk of 
political contagion. 
                                               
9 The survey evidence suggests that about 12% of voters switched from no to yes, but about 4% also hardened 
their position and switched from yes to now (Walter et al. 2018). 
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The degree to which each of these spillover effects will manifest themselves depends 
on the contours of the future relationship between the disintegrating and the remaining member 
states. Cooperation losses will be smaller, the closer the relations between the two sides remain 
to the current level of cooperation. This is most easily achieved by accommodating the 
disintegrating country’s requests. In contrast, the extent and direction of political contagion 
effects – encouragement or deterrence – will depend on how attractive the disintegrating 
country’s experience is. A positive experience, the more likely is it to encourage exit-tendencies 
in other member states. In contrast, a non-accommodative stance, such as refusing to 
renegotiate an agreement or insisting that a withdrawal from an existing agreement means that 
the disintegrating country can no longer enjoy the benefits of cooperation, makes exit costly for 
the leaving country, highlighting the benefits of the existing arrangement and is thus likely to 
reduce the risk of political contagion. Such a strategy is highly costly not just for the leaving 
state, however, but also for the remaining member states. Whether it is worthwhile to pursue 
this strategy thus depends both on how real the risks of political contagion are and how high 
the net costs of non-accommodation are for the remaining member states.  
The remaining member states thus face considerable challenges when confronted with 
a unilateral, voter-based disintegration bid by one member state, which they need to balance in 
the disintegration negotiations.10 These negotiations will be fundamentally shaped by the 
accommodation dilemma, the trade-off between the costs of a non-accommodative strategy and 
the contagion risks implied by an accommodative strategy. The contours of this dilemma and 
the extent to which it shapes international disintegration negotiations is likely to vary across 
disintegration cases, member states, and issue areas however, which is why we see considerable 
                                               
10 Note that the bargaining mandate can also be exercised by representatives of the international institution as such, 
as the EU did in the negotiations about the implementation of the Swiss mass immigration initiative. But because 
the bargaining outcome needs to be ratified by the remaining member states if it suggests substantive changes to 
the existing agreement, member state positions will be influential in these instances as well. 
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variation in how the other member states of an international institution react to a unilateral, 
voter-based renegotiation or withdrawal bid by one member state.  
First, countries weigh the costs of non-accommodation more heavily when the potential 
costs of this strategy to the domestic economy and society are high. The net costs of 
disintegration are usually distributed unequally among member states and differ across different 
issues. They are highest when a member state depends strongly on cooperation with the 
disintegrating state, and when its ability to potentially benefit from opportunities created by 
disintegration is low. This exposure to non-accommodation can vary considerably: a “hard 
Brexit,” for example, is estimated to put less than 0.5% of Slovakia’s and Bulgaria’s GDP, but 
more than 10% of Irish GDP at risk (Chen et al. 2018). It also varies across issue areas. The 
costs of non-accommodation are small for some issues (such as continued financial payments 
by the leaving state), whereas on other issues the trade-offs implied by the accommodation 
dilemma bite much more (such as trade restrictions), making non-accommodation more costly 
(Jurado et al. 2018). States will be particularly hawkish in disintegration cases and regarding 
negotiation issues in which their net domestic costs of non-accommodation are small, but more 
dovish on issues where non-accommodation is very costly for their domestic economy and 
society.  
Second, political contagion risks influence national negotiating positions. Because the 
bargaining outcome is likely to have significant spillover effects on the support for the 
international institution in all remaining member states, public opinion moves in the spotlight 
of the disintegration negotiations. Feedback effects between international negotiations and 
domestic public opinion are well known in international relations research (e.g. research on 
two-level games (Putnam 1988), audience costs (e.g. Fearon 1994; Tomz 2007) or the role of 
domestic politics for international politics more generally (e.g. Milner 1997; Moravcsik 1993, 
1997)). In addition to these vertical linkages between voters and their governments, however, 
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the contagion effects in disintegration negotiations mean that policymakers need to consider 
the contagion risks in other member states and in the withdrawing country (diagonal linkages) 
in parallel with the political contagion risks in their own country (vertical linkages). The higher 
the contagion risks in at least one member state, the more hawkish governments’ negotiation 
positions will usually be overall. This means that even if a government represents a country in 
which the mass public strongly supports continued membership, it will opt for a non-
accommodating strategy if it fears that accommodation will encourage integration-sceptics in 
another remaining member state. High contagion risks at home or in another member state thus 
increase support for a non-accommodation strategy. This effect will be particularly pronounced 
when the disintegration process is highly politicized.  
Third, the distribution of bargaining power between the disintegrating and the other 
member state shapes the negotiation dynamics. Relative bargaining power will be a key 
determinant with respect to how good a deal a withdrawing country can expect from the 
remaining member states. It also matters because non-accommodation can be very costly, but 
at the same time increases the likelihood that the withdrawing state might back down – 
generally the best outcome for the remaining states. This suggests that the remaining member 
states have stronger incentives to pursue a non-accommodative strategy vis-à-vis the 
disintegrating state when there are nontrivial chances that such a strategy will result in a 
retraction of the disintegration bid. This is most likely when the bargaining power of the 
remaining states is high. The level of bargaining power itself depends on a number of factors 
(Bailer 2004, 2010; Bailer et al. 2015; Dür et al. 2010; Finke et al. 2012; Moravcsik 1997; 
Thomson et al. 2006). The leverage of the remaining members tends to be higher when the 
number of remaining member states is high, when the interdependence between the 
disintegrating and the remaining member states is asymmetric and in favor of the latter 
(Keohane and Nye 1977), and when non-accommodation means continuing the status quo 
(Schimmelfennig 2020). Relative bargaining power also depends on the institutional setup of 
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the withdrawal process, frequently specified in the form of exit clauses (Huysmans 2019; Kucik 
and Reinhardt 2008; Pelc 2009; Rosendorff and Milner 2001) that disadvantage the 
withdrawing state and in the strength of the commitment to disintegration in the leaving state: 
not following a single-issue vote in a referendum is likely to be more costly than not 
implementing a campaign promise in an election campaign. Finally, the remaining member 
states also have more bargaining power when their preferences are homogenous with regard to 
a certain issue. For example, the ranks will be much more closed on issues such as continued 
financial contributions of the withdrawing state – which virtually all states are likely to favor – 
than on issues such as preferential market access, where positions are likely to be much more 
divided.  
Moreover, relative bargaining power also influences the level contagion risk: the extent 
to which a country’s disintegration experience serves as a good counterfactual for citizens in 
another country depends on how the latter compares to the disintegrating state in terms of 
bargaining power. The higher the disintegrating country’s bargaining power, the more likely 
will it be to extract concessions from the remaining members. This has implications for the 
contagion risks associated with the disintegration process. Table 1 shows that the contagion 
risks associated with accommodation are particularly high when the disintegrating state is 
relatively weak. If a weak state manages to secure significant concessions from the remaining 
states, this signals to most remaining states that it will be easy to get similar concessions, 
resulting in a strong encouragement effect. In contrast, the deterrence effect will be weak in 
cases where the state does not get concessions because it is unclear whether the unsuccessful 
disintegration experience can be attributed to a high level of resolve on the part of the remaining 
member states or simply to the lack of bargaining power of the disintegrating state. Likewise, 
accommodating a state with high bargaining power will not reverberate strongly. If, however, 




Table 1: Disintegration negotiation strategy, relative bargaining power, and contagion 
risks 
Relative to the disintegrating 
country, own country has… 
Non-accommodation 
(disintegration as failure) 
Accommodation 
(disintegration as success) 
more bargaining power Weak deterrence effect Strong encouragement effect 
less bargaining power Strong deterrence effect Weak encouragement effect 
 
Finally, because ideas also matter in international negotiations (e.g., McNamara 1998; 
Risse 2004), more integration-sceptic governments will be less concerned about contagion risks 
and are therefore more likely to accommodate a disintegrating state, not least because they may 
be interested in setting a positive precedent for leaving (Jurado et al. 2018). Against this 
backdrop, one would expect the remaining member states to vary in their responses to a 
disintegration referendum.  
 
4. Empirical Evidence  
The main purpose of this paper is to present a conceptual framework on how to think 
about the mass politics of disintegration, specifically voter-based disintegration processes. The 
framework has a multitude of empirical implications, which are impossible to test in the context 
of a single paper. Instead, I present some evidence designed to illustrate the usefulness of the 
framework. Drawing on original survey data and case study evidence, I explore the 
framework’s empirical implications regarding the ability of foreign governments’ to intervene 
in domestic disintegration referendum campaigns, variation in the responses of the remaining 




4.1 Pre-vote interventions in foreign disintegration referendum campaigns 
The first analysis focuses on the pre-referendum challenges for foreign policymakers. 
Because voters’ expectations about the likely consequences of a pro-disintegration vote have 
been shown to influence voters’ vote choice in disintegration referendums (Grynberg et al. 
2019; Muñoz and Tormos 2015; Walter et al. 2018), it examines to what extent foreign 
policymakers can influence voters’ expectations about the other member states’ likely response 
to a pro-disintegration vote in an ongoing disintegration referendum campaign.  
I draw on a survey experiment with 1778 British respondents conducted in a YouGov 
online poll two weeks before the 2016 Brexit referendum. The experiment explores whether 
and how warnings about the likely EU reaction to a pro-Brexit referendum vote influence 
respondents’ expectations about that “after a referendum vote to leave the EU, Britain and the 
EU [would] have to negotiate an agreement about their future relationship.” Respondents were 
randomly given one of four treatments,11 which informed them that a domestic (The Remain 
Campaign) or a foreign political actor (the Belgian Prime Minister, the President of the EU 
Commission, or the US president) had “warned that the EU will only sign such an agreement 
if it makes Britain worse off compared to where it stands now.” Respondents were then asked 
to rate their expectations about how a post-Brexit world would look like on a four-point-scale 
ranging from very unlikely to very likely: “In the run-up to the referendum, we have heard 
many different arguments about what would happen if the UK were to leave the EU. For each 
of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario will come true if Britain 
votes to leave the EU in the referendum? If Britain votes to leave the EU… a) Britain will lose 
full access to the EU’s single market, b) Britain will negotiate an agreement with the EU that 
leaves it worse off economically than it is today, c) the EU will do everything it can to make 
                                               
11 A fifth groups acted as control group and received no additional information 
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exit as painful for Britain as possible, and d) Britain will have less influence in international 
negotiations than as a EU member.”  
The data show that on average, expectations were rather balanced between optimistic 
and pessimistic expectations, with Leave-voters significantly more optimistic than Remainers 
(see also Grynberg et al. forthcoming; Owen and Walter 2017). These expectations were hard 
to move: Figure 2 shows that warnings by foreign policymakers representing another member 
state (the Belgian prime minister), the affected international institution (the President of the EU 
Commission) or another country (the US president) were not able to influence these 
expectations.12 The figure presents the marginal effects with 95% confidence intervals of each 
of the treatments in OLS regressions that control for respondents’ referendum vote intention, 
gender, age, political attention, social grade, and education on respondents’ expectations about 
the consequences of a pro-Brexit referendum vote. Although warnings by foreign policymakers, 
especially European politicians, did make voters somewhat more pessimistic about the 
consequences of a pro-Brexit vote, these effects were not statistically significant. Warnings 
attributed the US president made voters even more optimistic at times, although again the 






                                               
12 Full regression results can be found in the online appendix (table A1.2). Data are weighted. Results are generally 
robust when no control variables are included and when the control group that did not receive any warning is 
excluded and the remain campaign is used as baseline instead (Figures A1.1 and A1.2 in online appendix). 
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Figure 2: Survey Experiment: Effects of threats by different foreign actors on 
expectations 
 
This brief analysis suggests that it is indeed difficult for foreign policymakers to sway 
public opinion in disintegration referendum campaigns. This presents a considerable challenge 
to foreign policymakers ahead of a disintegration referendum in another member state. 
 
4.2 Contagion Risk and Brexit 
To explore contagion effects, the second set of empirical analyses returns to Brexit and 
explores how the Brexit negotiations about the Withdrawal Agreement have affected voters’ 
support for EU-exit in the remaining EU-27 member states. These negotiations, formally 
opened on 19 June 2017 and ending with the UK’s exit from the EU in January 2020, took 
much longer and turned out to be much more difficult than observers had originally expected. 
They revolved predominantly around the amount of money the UK would pay to the EU as a 






-.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Marginal effects
UK will lose single-market access UK economy worse
EU will make Brexit as painful as possible less international influence
Note: Controlling for gender, age, political attention, social grade, education, referendum vote intention
For each of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario
will come true if Britain votes to leave the EU in the referendum?
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and the question on how to safeguard the Irish peace process by avoiding a hard border between 
the republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The negotiations became increasingly protracted 
over time. Twice, around the original Brexit date in March 2019 and in the fall 2019, talks were 
close to failure as the British House of Commons repeatedly rejected negotiated versions of the 
Withdrawal Agreement. This was related to the fact that throughout the negotiations, the EU-
27 had pursued a rather non-accommodating negotiation strategy. Even when the risks of a “No 
Deal Brexit” became substantial, the EU-27 did not make major concessions to the UK. 
Ultimately, Boris Johnson successfully “renegotiated” and passed the Withdrawal Agreement 
by returning to an earlier EU proposal for the Irish border question. Britain officially left the 
European Union on January 31, 2020. 
Throughout the negotiations, it thus became increasingly clear that the UK’s hopes of a 
“cake and eat it”-Brexit were not going to be accepted by the EU-27. My argument suggests 
that this non-accommodating negotiation strategy should have a deterrence effect on voters in 
the remaining member and thus reduce support for exit in the EU-27. Moreover, this effect 
should be particularly strong among those countries who have less bargaining power than the 
UK. Because the UK is a country with high bargaining power, few countries have even more 
bargaining power. Realistically, only the two largest and oldest member states, Germany and 
France, have more bargaining power than the UK, because their withdrawal would 
fundamentally threaten the future of the European Union.  
To examine these hypotheses, I use data from a series of six EU-wide online polls that 
I conducted in six-months intervals between the start of the Brexit negotiations in July 2017 
and the end of the withdrawal negotiations in December 2019. Questions were placed on Dalia 
Research’s Europulse omnibus, which regularly surveys a census representative sample of 
between 9000-10000 working-age respondents per survey wave, who are drawn across the 
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remaining 27 EU Member States in sample sizes roughly proportional to their population size.13 
The data are then weighted by age, gender, level of education, and degree of urbanization, based 
upon the most recent Eurostat statistics. This setup allows me to explore how support for 
leaving the EU in the remaining member states has evolved in the shadow of the Brexit 
negotiations and whether we indeed can observe differences in contagion effects between 
countries with different levels of bargaining power.  
To examine whether contagion effects exist and whether they vary among states with 
high and low bargaining power, I conduct two different analyses. In the first analysis, I focus 
on the dynamics of change in support for EU-exit. For this analysis, I examine whether the 
propensity to support leaving the EU changed differently in countries with high and low 
bargaining power. Because the EU’s non-accommodating stance became particularly visible in 
the latter part of the Brexit negotiations, I expect a stronger deterrence effect among EU-27 
countries with weaker member states towards the end of the Withdrawal negotiations. 
Respondents’ support for an exit of their own country from the EU is measured with the 
question “If [YOUR COUNTRY] were to hold a referendum on leaving the EU today, how 
would you vote?” and answer categories (1) “definitely remain” (2) “probably remain” (3) 
“probably leave” and (4) “definitely leave.”14 To examine the dynamics of exit-support over 
the course of the Brexit negotiations, I estimate a hierarchical random-effects model that 
contains an interaction term between the dummy variables for each of the six survey waves and 
the Germany&France dummy variable, and controls for respondents’ demographics (age, 
gender, education, level of urbanization, and whether they are a citizen in their country of 
                                               
13 This means that small countries such as Malta or Luxembourg only have between 12-13 respondents per survey 
wave, whereas big countries such as Germany, France, or Italy have over 1000 respondents per wave. This 
omnibus has been used by other researchers as well (see e.g. Karstens 2019; De Vries 2018). The full sample size 
is 59 500 respondents. 
14 Those replying “don’t know”, about 10% of the sample, were coded as missing. Results are robust to using a 
dummy variable denoting those who would probably/definitely vote leave. 
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residence) as well as the pre-Brexit country-level euroskepticism (share of people viewing the 
EU (very) negatively as recorded in the Spring 2016 Eurobarometer wave). 15 
Figure 3 shows the average marginal effects of the different survey waves on 
respondents’ propensity to support an exit of their own country from the EU, relative to the 
support levels at the beginning of the Brexit negotiations in summer 2017 in Germany and 
France (right-hand panel), and in the rest of the EU-27 (left hand panel).16 It shows that over 
the first half of the Brexit negotiations, exit-support did not change much in most EU-27 states. 
In line with the expectation that encouragement effects are stronger in countries with high 
bargaining power, exit support even increased in Germany and France. Average French and 
German support for EU-exit then remained at levels similar to those at the outset of the 
negotiations. In contrast, exit-support in the rest of the EU-27 decreased over time, especially 
when the negotiations became more difficult. Especially the UK’s first failed attempt to leave 
the EU in March 2019, this support decreased considerably. In line with the argument, we thus 
see a significant deterrence effect for countries with less bargaining power than the UK. At the 
same time, for those countries with more bargaining power, there is some evidence consistent 






                                               
15 Because EU-related attitudes are likely to be endogenous to the negotiation process, I do not control for any 
individual attitudinal variables. 
16 Regression tables for all analyses can be found in the online appendix. 
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Figure 3: The Brexit Withdrawal negotiations and propensity to support EU exit: 
Average marginal effects relative to July 2017 
 
 
To further probe the possible contagion effects of Brexit, I next examine how 
respondents’ assessment of the British Brexit experience is related to their support for exit, and 
whether these contagion effects vary by a country’s bargaining power. Respondents’ Brexit 
assessment was measured with the question “Five years from now on, do you think Brexit will 
make the UK much better off/somewhat better off/neither better nor worse off/somewhat worse 
off/much worse off?” The answers to this question reveal that EU-27 Europeans differ 
considerably in their Brexit assessments: About 28% expect that Brexit will be positive and 
42% negative for the UK, and these assessments are highly correlated with respondents’ support 
for an EU-exit of their own country. To examine whether this relationship is moderated by the 
home country’s bargaining power, I estimate another set of hierarchical models that pools all 
six survey waves and interacts respondents’ Brexit assessment with the dummy variable that 
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(Germany and France) and all other EU-27 member states using the same demographic control 
variables as above. Because this opinion is highly correlated with people’s assessment of how 
Brexit is going, I additionally control for individuals’ opinion of the EU, using both a general 
question about respondents’ opinion of the EU and one measuring respondents’ preferred future 
course for the European Union. 
 
Figure 4: Predicted average support for own country’s EU exit, by respondents’ 
assessment of the medium-term effects of Brexit on the UK. 
 
 
My argument suggests that positive assessments of the UK’s Brexit experience should 
encourage EU-27 Europeans to support an EU-exit of their own country, whereas negative 
assessments should deter them. Moreover, the encouragement effect should be stronger and the 
deterrence effect weaker in high-bargaining power countries. Figure 4 shows that we can indeed 
observe a significantly stronger encouragement effect in high-bargaining power countries. 
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likely to support an exit of their own country from the EU, and this effect is significantly 
stronger in France and Germany than in the other EU-27 countries. We can also observe that 
those who believe that Brexit will make the UK (much) worse off in the medium term, are 
significantly less likely to support EU-exit. However, this effect does not vary by bargaining 
power.  
Taken together, the analysis of EU-27 public opinion data suggests that Brexit does 
indeed have contagion effects in the EU’s remaining member states. Both encouragement and 
deterrence effects can be observed, and there is some evidence that the strength of these 
contagion effects is conditioned by countries’ bargaining power. Especially the encouragement 
effect is stronger in countries with high-bargaining power, whereas the evidence is less robust 
that the deterrence effect is weaker in these countries.  
 
4.3 Disintegration Negotiations: Responses of the remaining member states  
To what extent does the argument made in this paper extend beyond Brexit? To examine 
this question, the final analysis explores how the accommodation dilemma shaped how other 
countries responded to three other voter-based disintegration bids: Switzerland’s 2014 bid to 
renegotiate its bilateral treaty with the EU on free movement of people, Greenland’s 1982 
referendum vote to leave the European Community, the 2017 US decision to leave the Paris 
Climate accord, and compares these responses to the Brexit process that started after the 2016 
referendum.  
In line with the discussion above about the importance of both bargaining power and 
the other member states’ responses, table 2 classifies these episodes of voter-based 
disintegration into the four categories introduced above. The upper left-hand corner contains a 
case of voter-based renegotiation or withdrawal bids by a states with low bargaining power, 
Switzerland’s referendum vote in 2014 to restrict immigration and subsequent decision not to  
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Table 2: Bargaining power and response by other member states to voter-based 
disintegration bids 
 Non-accommodation Accommodation 
 
Disintegrating  
country has  
low bargaining power 
[weak deterrence effect] 
 
Switzerland: 2014 Freedom 
of Movement Renegotiation 
 
 
[strong encouragement risk] 
 





country has  
high bargaining power 
[strong deterrence effect] 
 
UK: 2016 Brexit* 
 
* some accommodation 
 
[weak encouragement risk] 
 





extend freedom of movement to nationals of a new EU member state (Croatia) in violation of 
its bilateral treaties with the EU. As a non-EU member with a high trade dependence on the 
EU, Switzerland has less bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU than most EU member states.17 
Because accommodation in such an instance carries the biggest contagion risks of encouraging 
similar attempts elsewhere, my argument suggests that the Swiss referendum-based demands 
to renegotiate the bilateral treaty on the free movement of people should be met with 
considerable resistance from the other party to the bilateral treaty, the EU and its member states. 
In line with this expectation, the EU reacted to the Swiss bid by barring Switzerland’s access 
to the new Horizon 2020 research program, which eventually succeeded in convincing the 
Swiss parliament not to implement the referendum and to honor its obligations enshrined in the 
bilateral treaties. The EU and its member states made disintegration very costly for Switzerland, 
and the Swiss ultimately reconsidered their bid to renegotiate and implemented the 2014 
referendum vote on the “Mass Immigration Initiative” in a way that left the rights of EU citizens 
                                               
17 The weak bargaining position was compounded by the institutional setting, in which the so-called “guillotine 
clause” stipulates that all seven bilateral treaties I will be terminated if Switzerland withdraws from one of them 
(such as the treaty on the free movement of people). 
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untouched. As suggested by my argument, Switzerland’s failure to win any concessions from 
the EU in the aftermath of its 2014 referendum “against mass immigration” has not had any 
significant effect on support for similar demands of limiting free movement in the remaining 
member states. However, had the EU allowed Switzerland to introduce restrictions on the free 
movement of people, it is likely that this decision would have sparked a wave of similar 
demands for exceptions across the EU. 
It is therefore not surprising that there is only one case in which the voter-based 
disintegration demands of a country with low bargaining power were accommodated by the 
other member states (upper right-hand corner): Greenland’s 1982 referendum vote to end 
European Communities (EC) membership. Although this disintegration process, which resulted 
in Greenland’s exit from the EC but gave it a special status as one of the EU’s overseas countries 
and territories, was far from easy and involved three years of negotiations, the willingness of 
the other member states to accommodate this request can be explained by the fact that 
Greenland presented a very special case, which considerably limited contagion risks. Greenland 
had joined the then EC in 1973 as a part of Denmark even though a large majority of 
Greenlanders had voted against accession in Denmark’s 1972 EC accession referendum. The 
vote to leave the EC was held shortly after Greenland had gained autonomy and the right to 
home rule within the Kingdom of Denmark just a few years later. Because this setting was so 
special, it was unlikely to spark similar demands elsewhere in the EC.  
In contrast, my argument suggests that bids for renegotiation of the terms of an 
international agreement in one country’s favor can be relatively successful without sparking 
major contagion if the disintegrating state is powerful (lower right-hand corner). This is 
illustrated by the willingness of Mexico and Canada to engage in renegotiations of the NAFTA 
treaty with the US. In these renegotiations, launched in order to keep a key campaign promise 
of US president Trump, the US secured concessions from Mexico and Canada in the 
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renegotiated USMCA treaty that left the former worse off and the US better off than under 
NAFTA.18 The success of the world’s hegemon in extracting concessions from Mexico and 
Canada is not likely to fuel similar demands elsewhere, however. At the same time, the fact that 
even the US had to make some compromises in these negotiations, is likely to create a certain 
deterrence effect because it underlines how large the losses from a reduction of the existing 
cooperation gains can be.  
Finally, the lower left-hand corner contains a case of non-accommodation of powerful 
disintegrating states. Empirically, there are few cases in this category and the responses tend to 
be more accommodating than with regard to less powerful states. To set the previous analyses 
in context, I focus here once more on Brexit as a prime case in this category. Although the EU 
has accepted the UK’s wish to leave the EU, whereas it refused to even officially open 
negotiations about a potential treaty change with Switzerland, the EU’s approach to Brexit has 
largely been non-accommodating during the withdrawal negotiations. However, with exception 
of the negotiations about the Irish question, these negotiations have covered issues (such as the 
UK “Brexit bill”) in which the accommodation dilemma for the EU-27 is less pronounced. In 
contrast, the negotiations about the post-Brexit relationship between the UK and the EU 
confronts especially those countries who trade heavily with the UK, such as Germany, Ireland, 
or the Netherlands, with a significant accommodation dilemma. On the one hand, significantly 
restricting British access to the EU’s Single Market and cooperative relations more generally 
will be very costly not just for the UK, but also for these remaining member states. But on the 
other hand, making the UK better off outside the EU by allowing it to enjoy the benefits of EU 
integration without sharing the costs represents a significant threat to the long-term stability of 
the EU. Because some member states are much less exposed to the economic Brexit fallout, 
this perspective suggests that the accommodation dilemma is likely to become more acute for 
                                               
18 Note that it is contested how large these concessions actually were. 
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some EU member states than others during the Brexit negotiations about the future relationship. 
This is likely to increase heterogeneity in EU-27 negotiation preferences (Hix 2018). 
Overall, this discussion shows that in line with the argument put forward in this article, 
there is indeed considerable variation in how the members of an international institution 
respond to one member’s bid to withdraw or renegotiate.  
 
 
5. Conclusion: Voter-based disintegration, a democratic threat to international 
cooperation? 
This paper has introduced a framework for analyzing a relatively recent phenomenon 
with far-reaching systemic consequences: voter-based disintegration bids. It has argued that 
these episodes can be analyzed in a coherent framework that puts the accommodation dilemma 
that these cases generate in the center of attention. Focusing on the challenges that voter-based 
disintegration poses to the remaining member states, it has argued that these challenges are 
considerable, both before and after pro-disintegration votes in another member state, because it 
confronts the remaining member states with an accommodation dilemma. Using original survey 
data from the UK and the EU-27 as well as case study evidence to explore some implications 
of this broader framework, the paper has illustrated the frameworks’ usefulness.19  
The recent successes of populist parties, candidates, and initiatives have often been 
based on a common narrative: that by being more assertive in international relations and putting 
the nation’s interest first rather than accepting compromise, the country’s prosperity, national 
sovereignty, and democratic quality could be improved. Upon closer inspection, however, these 
promises have usually proven to be built on quicksand. Successes at the domestic polls have 
                                               
19 Although the discussion has centered on voter-based disintegration in this paper, the accommodation dilemma 
is likely to shed light on the responses to elite-based disintegration and non-compliances as well. 
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been met with resistance abroad. Renegotiating international agreements has proven difficult, 
if not impossible, and has sometimes forced populist governments to concede that the status 
quo is better than what they could achieve if they left such an agreement. Although these 
setbacks have decreased the appeal of such messages to some extent (De Vries 2018; Walter 
2019b), they still garner considerable support. This paper has demonstrated that so far, voter-
based attempts to unilaterally change or withdraw from the rules of international cooperation 
have often failed, not because of poor negotiation skills on part of the governments of the 
withdrawing states, but because they invoke a central trilemma in international relations: Rarely 
do the trade-offs between international cooperation, democracy, and national sovereignty 
(Rodrik 2011) move into the spotlight more prominently than when one country votes on an 
issue in which other countries equally have a large stake.  
Yet the failure of populist promises to materialize bears its own risk. When governments 
tasked with implementing populist referendum outcomes have not been able to deliver the 
promised lands of milk and honey, they have been decried by populists as incompetent or 
unwilling to implement the will of the people. Resistance of foreign governments against one 
country’s wishes for unilateral change has been condemned as a lack of respect of democracy. 
And because intergovernmental bargaining tends to take place between a relatively small 
number of few government officials behind closed doors, its outcomes have often been 
characterized as elitist decisions by bureaucrats who have lost touch with normal people. There 
is thus a risk that the failure of voter-based disintegration initiatives breeds even more 
resentment and feeding ground for populists. Dealing with this democratic threat to the liberal 
world order is no easy task. It is important, but not easy, for policymakers to communicate 
clearly the trade-offs and constraints under which they operate. They also need to straddle the 
rope between accommodating too much and risking contagion on one hand and accommodating 
too little and risking backlash on the other. Only one thing is certain: it is impossible to ignore 
this challenge to international cooperation from below.   
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Table A1.1 Descriptive Statistics, pre-Brexit analysis 
 
Variable  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Expectation Single Market Access 1,441 2.503 0.974 1 4 
Warning: none (control) 1,441 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Warning: Remain Camp 1,441 0.206 0.405 0 1 
Warning: Belgian PM 1,441 0.199 0.400 0 1 
Warning: EU Commission 
President 1,441 0.201 0.401 0 1 
Warning: US president 1,441 0.196 0.397 0 1 
Male (dummy) 1,441 0.484 0.500 0 1 
Age in years 1,441 49.770 16.803 18 90 
Political attention 1,441 7.322 2.298 1 11 
Social grade 1,441 3.205 1.524 1 6 
Secondary education 1,441 0.375 0.484 0 1 
Tertiary education 1,441 0.455 0.498 0 1 
EU-Referendum: Remain 1,441 0.445 0.497 0 1 
EU-Referendum: Leave  1,441 0.456 0.498 0 1 
EU-Referendum: Would not vote 1,441 0.017 0.128 0 1 











Economy will be 
worse off 
Eu will make 
exit painful 
UK will have 
less influence 
internationally    
Remain Camp 0.095 -0.074 -0.107 -0.040    
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)    
Belgian PM 0.105 0.069 0.230** 0.075    
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)    
President EC 0.081 0.106 0.110 0.079    
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)    
US president -0.039 -0.081 -0.137 0.046    
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)    
male -0.147** -0.042 -0.112* -0.013    
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)    
Age 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.001    
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Politica 0.029** 0.037*** -0.007 -0.003    
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
socialgrade -0.022 0.000 0.012 -0.003    
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)    
secondary -0.014 -0.078 -0.195** -0.154*   
 (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09)    
tertiary 0.029 0.074 -0.086 -0.040    
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09)    
Leave -1.356*** -1.718*** -0.118 -1.982*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)    
Will not vote -0.434*** -0.520*** -0.536*** -0.910*** 
 (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14)    
Don't know -0.611*** -0.776*** -0.247** -1.106*** 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)    
Constant 3.451*** 3.718*** 3.576*** 4.312*** 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19)    
N 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000    
r2 0.250 0.414 0.029 0.437    
r2_a                    






Table A1.1 Descriptive Statistics, EU-27 analysis 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vote in hypothetical EU-exit referendum 53,706 1.905 1.026 1 4 
Leaver (Dummy) 53,706 0.256 0.437 0 1 
Age in years 53,706 39.973 13.648 14 69 
Education 53,706 3.154 0.786 1 4 
Female (Dummy) 53,706 0.475 0.499 0 1 
Rural (Dummy) 53,706 0.269 0.443 0 1 
Citizenship (Dummy) 53,706 0.970 0.170 0 1 
% viewing EU negatively  
(Spring 2016 Eurobarometer) 53,706 25.542 7.099 9 51 
EU Evaluation 53,705 2.396 1.135 0 4 
Preferred future course for EU 53,706 1.909 1.094 0 3 
ExpectedBrexit-effect on UK 49,488 2.788 1.165 1 5 
Germany+France (Dummy) 53,706 0.289 0.453 0 1 
July 17 wave 53,706 0.153 0.360 0 1 
Dec 17  wave 53,706 0.155 0.362 0 1 
June 18  wave 53,706 0.150 0.357 0 1 
Dec 18  wave 53,706 0.170 0.375 0 1 
July 19  wave 53,706 0.178 0.383 0 1 




Table A1.2: Support for own country’s EU exit over the course of the Brexit withdrawal 
negotiations: hierarchical random-effects models 
  
Vote in hypothetical 
EU referendum Leaver (Dummy) 
Vote in hypothetical 
EU referendum 
  [see figure 3]     
Age in years 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.005*** 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education -0.153*** -0.040*** -0.153*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Female (Dummy) 0.005 -0.025*** 0.005 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Rural (Dummy) 0.065*** 0.022*** 0.065*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Citizenship (Dummy) 0.210*** 0.103*** 0.209*** 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
% viewing EU negatively  0.015*** 0.005***   
  (0.00) (0.00)   
Dec 17  wave -0.032 -0.006 -0.032 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
June 18  wave -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Dec 18  wave -0.038** -0.022*** -0.038** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
July 19  wave -0.159*** -0.057*** -0.159*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Dec 19  wave -0.122*** -0.040*** -0.122*** 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Germany+France (Dummy) -0.059 -0.023 0.020 
  (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) 
Dec 17 * DE+FR 0.044 0.013 0.044 
  (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) 
Jul 18 * DE+FR 0.104** 0.031** 0.104** 
  (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Dec 18 * DE+FR 0.118 0.044 0.118 
  (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) 
Jul 19 * DE+FR 0.086 0.027 0.086 
  (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
Dec 19 * DE+FR 0.147*** 0.033** 0.147*** 
  (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Constant 1.665*** 0.069** 2.014*** 
  (0.10) (0.03) (0.08) 
Log Likelihood -75088.838 -32131.03 -75096.162 
N (individuals) 53706 59458 53706 
N (countries) 27 27 27 
 5 
Table A1.3: Support for own country’s EU exit. Hierarchical random-effects models 
  Vote in hypothetical 
EU referendum 
Vote in hypothetical 
EU referendum 
Age in years 0.006*** 0.001     
(0.00) (0.00)    
Education -0.077*** -0.039***  
(0.01) (0.01)    
Female (Dummy) 0.002 -0.001     
(0.02) (0.01)    
Rural (Dummy) 0.059*** 0.031***  
(0.01) (0.01)    
Citizenship (Dummy) 0.145*** 0.090***  
(0.03) (0.03)    
% viewing EU negatively  0.011*** 0.002     
(0.00) (0.00)    
Dec 17  wave -0.015 -0.010     
(0.03) (0.02)    
June 18  wave -0.006 0.016     
(0.03) (0.01)    
Dec 18  wave 0.017 -0.019     
(0.03) (0.02)    
July 19  wave -0.089** -0.087***  
(0.04) (0.02)    
Dec 19  wave -0.036 -0.045***  
(0.02) (0.01)    
Brexit = UK much worse off -0.482*** -0.327***  
(0.04) (0.03)    
Brexit = UK somewhat worse off -0.439*** -0.277***  
(0.03) (0.02)    
Brexit = UK somewhat better off 0.444*** 0.203***  
(0.05) (0.03)    
Brexit = UK much better off 0.994*** 0.382***  
(0.07) (0.03)    
DE+FR 0.143** 0.025     
(0.06) (0.03)    
Much worse off * DE+FR -0.200*** -0.079     
(0.06) (0.06)    
somewhat worse off * DE+FR -0.132*** -0.048*    
(0.03) (0.02)    
somewhat better off * DE+FR 0.079 0.065**   
(0.08) (0.03)    
much better off * DE+FR 0.165** 0.065**   
(0.07) (0.03)    
EU very negative   1.286***  
  (0.03)    
EU somewhat negative   0.641***  
  (0.03)    
EU somewhat positive   -0.516***  
  (0.02)    
EU very positive   -0.746***  
  (0.02)    
Preferred future for EU: don't know   -0.040*    
  (0.02)    
Preferred future: more competencies for EU   -0.127***  
  (0.03)    
Preferred future for EU: keep current power distribution    -0.117***  
  (0.02)    
Constant 1.479*** 1.605***  
(0.10) (0.07)    
Log Likelihood  -62057.819 -49686.965 
N (individuals/countries) 49488/27 49487/27 
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Figure A1.1: Robustness: No control variables 
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EU will make Brexit as painful as possible less international influence
Note: Controlling for gender, age, political attention, social grade, education, referendum vote intention
For each of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario
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Marginal effects
UK will lose single-market access New agreement will leave UK worse off economically
EU will make Brexit as painful as possible Uk will have less international influence
Note: Controlling for gender, age, political attention, social grade, education, referendum vote intention
For each of the following scenarios, how likely do you think that this scenario
will come true if Britain votes to leave the EU in the referendum?
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